Significant Reform of the Canada Business Corporations Act by LaRue, Linda Stewart
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 10 | Number 1 Article 8
2004
Significant Reform of the Canada Business
Corporations Act
Linda Stewart LaRue
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Linda Stewart LaRue, Significant Reform of the Canada Business Corporations Act, 10 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 215 (2004)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol10/iss1/8




HE Canadian legal system evolved in large part from the common
law of England and from the civil law of France in the province of
Quebec.1 The British North America Act of 1867 and its amend-
ments (the BNA) were essentially a "first constitution" and governed the
structure of the legal system exclusively until 1982, when Queen Eliza-
beth II proclaimed the Constitution Act (the Act). 2 The Constitution Act
severed the power of the British parliament over Canada.3 The Act
maintained the constitutional status of the BNA's provisions and adopted
the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms (a unified written version of the
documents used as a basis for the "unwritten" British constitution). 4
What emerged in final form was the Dominion of Canada, a constitu-
tional monarchy under the auspices of the English sovereign. The practi-
cal influence and power of the Queen, of course, is marginal. On the
federal level, Parliament is the prevailing government form and is com-
posed of Sovereign, Senate, and House of Commons.5 The Prime Minis-
ter is the leading executive, and selects a Governor General who is
nominally approved by the Sovereign as her representative in Canada.6
The country is composed of ten provinces and three territories, all with a
long history of common and civil law, stare decisis, and a wealth of Cana-
dian, U.K., and Commonwealth precedent. 7
These historical antecedents have created a unique blend of federal
and provincial government whereby the member provinces enjoy certain
exclusive powers, the federal government reserves other powers (includ-
ing those not delineated), and there is shared jurisdiction in others. In
*J.D. Candidate May 2004, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist
University.
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addition to the federal document, each province has its own constitution. 8
The provincial statutes (and the applicable common law) govern trade
within a province. In particular, the BNA allocated regulation of interna-
tional and interprovincial trade and commerce to the federal govern-
ment.9 From this framework, surfaces both a provincial chartering
program for businesses confining their activity to a single province, and a
federal chartering system for businesses trading internationally or be-
tween provinces. In certain situations, federally chartered businesses may
be required to obtain extraprovincial licenses for the provinces in which
they operate or own land.10
The Canada Business Corporations Act (CBNA) governs federally
chartered entities.' 1 The CBNA came into force in December 1975 and
was largely unchanged aside from some technical amendments until
1994.12 The 1994 changes largely dealt with filing matters concerning fi-
nancial statements, waiver of audit requirements, and short form vertical
amalgamations (more commonly called mergers in the United States). 13
Shortly thereafter the Office of Industry Canada began studying, solicit-
ing opinions, and drafting a revised CBCA statute encompassing over 220
changes.14
In fact, the Canadian government hopes that federal chartering will be-
come more prevalent. Currently, the vast majority of corporations
choose provincial chartering with interprovincial licensing for nationwide
business. For instance, during the twelve-month period ending March 27,
1997 only Quebec and the Northwest Territories reported more than 6
percent of their charters awarded under federal law.15 As a result, forum
shopping among the provinces by corporations is prevalent, and the fed-
eral jurisprudence on corporate law remains underdeveloped. 16 Just as
Delaware has emerged as the forum of choice for U.S. corporations, the
Ontario statutes have been embraced most fully by Canadian corpora-
tions, and the resulting jurisprudence has the greatest depth. It is not
uncommon for statutes and regulations passed in Ontario to be copied in
other jurisdictions, but many lawyers remain uncomfortable with the fed-
eral regime for incorporation and subsequent corporate governance.
One of the significant effects of the amended CBCA is that private and
closely held companies may now be inclined to incorporate via the fed-
8. Id. at Can-2.
9. Harry Swain, The Privatization Experience in Canada, at http://www.aucc.ca/en/
programs/carruthers-slides.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
10. MARTINDALE-HtjBBEIL, supra note 5.
11. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44 (1985) (Can.).
12. WAYNE D. GRAY & CASEY W. HALLADAY, GUIDE TO CBCA REFORM: ANALYSIS
AND PRECEDENTS 9 (2002) [hereinafter GRAY & HALLADAY].
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at n .36 noting Wayne D. Gray, Shopping for That Perfect Corporate Statute, in
RETURN OF THE SIX-MINUTE CORPORATE LAWYER (Law Society of Upper Ca-
nada, Department of Continuing Legal Education, ed., 2002) [hereinafter Gray].
16. Gray &. Halladay, supra note 12, at n.36.
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eral charter. Before the amendments federally chartered companies had
to prepare audited financial statements and file them with the CBCA di-
rector once they reached $10 million in revenues. 17 The complete lack of
privacy for financial information was a serious concern to the closely held
or private company.
II. GENERAL CANADIAN CORPORATE LAW
While the CBCA applies to most companies operating under a federal
charter, the earlier Canada Corporations Act (R.S.C. 1970, c. C-32) gov-
erns those companies without share capital, such as those engaged in
charitable and other similar activities.1 8 The Minister of Industry Canada
is responsible for the general supervision and administration of both the
Canada Corporations Act and the CBCA.' 9 The CBCA is rooted in a
"minimum standards/shareholder based model" that views substantial
regulation and defined structure as the best measures to regulate corpo-
rate behavior. 20 In contrast, the most influential corporate statute in the
United States, that of Delaware, is based on an "enabling/board of direc-
tors model" that encourages discretion by corporate directors in their
business judgment.2' Several of the modifications of the CBCA ease the
statutory requirements and shift the Canadian model towards that of the
United States.
The drive to revise the CBCA in a significant way was led by Industry
Canada and involved consultations over six years. 22 The initial version of
the amended CBCA was released on March 21, 2000 as Bill S-19.23 The
time period for responses was an exceptionally short five weeks, but de-
spite this time constraint the corporate bar filed extensive comments and
suggestions. 24 Bill S-19 died, however, when Parliament was dissolved in
October 2000.25 When Parliament reconvened in February 2001, Bill S-11
was introduced as a successor to the previous S-19.26 While Bill S-11 in-
corporated some of the technical suggestions made by the corporate bar,
it explicitly rejected many of the more substantive suggestions.2 7 The
new bill passed and, along with a new set of regulations, became law on
17. Id. at 72.
18. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 5, at Can-2. The general categories of business
subject to the Canada Corporations Act instead of the CBCA are national, patri-
otic, philanthropic, charitable, scientific, artistic, social, professional or sporting in
character.
19, Id.
20. Ruth 0. Karas, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canada-U.S. Comparative
Analysis, 28 MAN. L.J. 303, 313 (2002).
21. Id. at 313.
22. John Kazanjian & Firoz Ahmed, Reform of the Canada Business Corporations Act,
12 CAN. CURR. TAX 1 (2001) [hereinafter Kazanjian & Ahmed].
23. Gray &. Halladay, supra note 12, at 11.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.; S.C. ch.14 (2001) (Can.).
27. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 10.
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November 24, 2001.28
The goals of the amended CBCA are many, but mainly focus on a
modernization of the statute to embrace the global nature of business in
the 21st century and to increase the competitiveness of national and inter-
national Canadian businesses both at home and abroad. Many of the
amendments to the CBCA were adopted to take advantage of new tech-
nology.29 Whereas previously routine filings were the only documents
that could be electronically transmitted, the amendments attempt to in-
corporate electronic communications whenever possible. 30 This change
means that meetings of directors and communications with shareholders
will be facilitated by electronic means, as long as notice requirements are
met.
Specifically, the revised CBCA states its purpose as follows:
The purposes of this Act are to revise and reform the law applicable
to business corporations incorporated to carry on business through-
out Canada, to advance the cause of uniformity of business corpora-
tion law in Canada and to provide a means of allowing an orderly
transference of certain federal companies incorporated under vari-
ous Acts of Parliament to this Act.31
Modernizing the CBCA means redefining the duties and liabilities of
officers and directors to make them similar to the U.S. model. At the
same time, shareholder democracy and rights are enhanced as a counter-
balance. The resulting mix of corporate statutes is more modern, but re-
mains uniquely Canadian..
The new version of the CBCA allocates issues subject to frequent
change (those dealing with prices and the like) to the new regulations to
limit the frequency of amendments to the CBCA itself. Applicable regu-
lations are designated the Canada Business Corporations Regulations
(CBCR).
Some of the more significant changes to the CBCA are those made to
definitions. For instance, in order to draw more business forms under its
umbrella, the amended CBCA redefines "entities" so as to encompass all
forms of business enterprise. 32 Corporations, partnerships, associations,
and even unincorporated forms are all susceptible to regulation under the
CBCA. 33
Another significant term redefined under the CBCA is "officer." 34 A
specific list of titles has been added to the definition as well as those en-




31. Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA), R.S.C. (1985), amended by ch. C-
44§ 4, 2001.
32. Id. § 2(1).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 1(5).
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officers. 35 Included in the list of specific titles is "vice president," "con-
troller," and "general manager. ' 36 The impact of the inclusion of these
titles is that entities sometimes name vice-presidents indiscriminately, and
small companies may appoint controllers and general managers without
intending them to exercise the duties of officers.37 It will be important
for all federally chartered companies to evaluate their job titles to align
director/officer liability with their corporate intent to do so.
III. EARLY INCORPORATION ISSUES
Incorporation under the CBCA had been a right, rather than a privi-
lege. 38 This meant that if the articles of incorporation were in correct
form, Industry Canada was required to accept them and issue the certifi-
cate of incorporation. A new additional section grants the government
administrator discretion to refuse to issue a certificate of incorporation if
he receives notice that, if incorporated, the new corporation would not be
in compliance with the CBCA.39
The amended CBCA also broadens personal liability for pre-incorpo-
ration contracts. While the previous provisions of the CBCA only at-
tached liability for persons actually entering into a pre-incorporation
contract, the new CBCA covers those situations in which a person "pur-
ports to enter" into a pre-incorporation contract.40 This change also cor-
rects case law precedent that created a loophole in pre-formation
contract liability. In Westcom Radio Group Ltd. v. Maclssac, the Ontario
Divisional Court held that contracts with yet-to-be-formed business enti-
ties are null and void if both parties mistakenly thought the corporation
was in existence and neither party intended the promoter to be personally
liable.41 Further, in a pair of opinions, the General Division of the Onta-
rio Court held that a corporation may not enter into pre-formation con-
tracts even if the parties so intend.42 These cases created important
precedent because Ontario corporate jurisprudence is the most devel-
oped in the country. Without a statutory amendment, pre-formation lia-
bility would disappear . The statutory changes overrule these cases and
ease pre-formation uncertainty.
IV. CORPORATE OFFICES AND RECORDS
The earlier versions of the CBCA required a company to record the




38. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 5, at Can-2.
39. CBCA § 8(2).
40. CBCA § 14(1) (1985) now replaced by CBCA § 7(1) (2001).
41. Westcom Radio Group Ltd. v. Maclsaac, [1989] 70 O.R. (2d) 591, 63 D.L.R. (4th)
433.
42. Vacation Brokers, Inc. v. Joseph, [1993] 10 B.L.R. (2d) 229, [1993] O.J. No. 3036
(OL); Vacation Brokers, Inc. v. Penney, [1998] 82 A.C.W.S. (3d) 62.
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the corporation to simply name the province within Canada where the
registered office will remain. 43 Further, the corporate records had to re-
main in Canada. Now, the amendment allows for storage outside of Ca-
nada, as long as the records may be accessed from a computer at the
registered office or other designated place within Canada.44 An affidavit
is newly required, however, for anyone wishing to examine the securities
register of the company. 45 The purpose of the affidavit is to record the
identity of persons or agents who access the shareholder lists maintained
in the securities register. Anonymous access of records is thereby
eliminated.
Finally, the new CBCA eliminates the need for the adoption of a cor-
porate seal and allows changes in an already adopted one.46 Documents
are not rendered invalid simply because the corporate seal is missing.4 7
V. CORPORATE FINANCE ISSUES
Sophisticated corporate finance is a seemingly ever-changing area. The
amended CBCA allows federally chartered Canadian companies to use
certain transaction forms that had been previously forbidden. For the
purposes of corporate finance issues, the new CBCA redefines "prop-
erty" when used as a form of compensation (instead of money). 48 The
previous definition excluded "a promissory note, or a promise to pay, that
is made by a person to whom a share is issued.149 This meant that a
company could not issue a share of stock as consideration for the receipt
of a promissory note. 50 The new definition adds an exclusion for "a
promise to pay, that is made by a person who does not deal at arm's
length, within the meaning of that expression in the Income Tax Act, with
a person to whom a share is issued. '51 Therefore, now transactions at
arm's length are allowed. 52 Because of this amendment, the balance in
the stated capital account will be equal to that used for tax purposes.53
Stated capital accounts are the beneficiary of several changes of the
CBCA. 54 Previously, there were only two occasions when a company
could issue shares without full and complete consideration. These in-
volved either shares issued in a merger or in exchange for property.55
The amended CBCA is flexible in terms of the amount added to the
43. CBCA § 6(1)(b).
44. Id. § 20(5.1).
45. Id. § 21(1.1).
46. Id. § 23(1).
47. Id. § 23(2).
48. Id. § 25(5).
49. Id.
50. Gray &. Halladay, supra note 12, at 11.
51. CBCA § 25(5).
52. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 1.
53. Id.
54. CBCA § 26(3).
55. Id. §§ 26(3)(b), 23(3)(a). See GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 17.
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stated capital account, even when the transaction is at arm's length.56
The transactions must receive unanimous approval by several groups: the
shareholders of that class of stock, the corporation through its directors,
and the party acting as the transferor. The purpose of this limitation is to
allow interested parties to veto dilution of stated capital. 57
These arm's length transactions will require corporations to issue a sep-
arate series of stock to tender in exchange. 58 The amended CBCA, how-
ever, has made issuing a new class of stock much easier.59 The previous
requirement created a two-step process by which the articles of incorpo-
ration were specifically amended to allow issuing a certain named class of
stock (or the directors were specifically authorized to issue a class of
shares by name), and then the directors actually met and authorized the
shares to be issued. 60 The articles of incorporation may now authorize
any class of shares to be issued by the directors, and so eliminate one of
the steps. Traditionalists may be uncomfortable with the collapse of the
process into a single step for fear of director misconduct, but this is an-
other example of the change in philosophy embodied by the new CBCA;
the discretion of directors is now favored over more detailed regulations
of their behaviors. The directors have been granted further discretion by
the amended CBCA to fix the number of shares available across all clas-
ses and to assign the rights, privileges, and conditions. 61 The previous
version of the CBCA required the shares and their designations to be set
out in the articles of incorporation.
As a general rule, federally chartered Canadian corporations may not
hold their own shares, nor may a subsidiary acquire shares in the par-
ent.62 This requirement has impeded transactional flexibility in corporate
matters. The amended CBCA has expanded the exceptions to the gen-
eral rule so that subsidiaries may acquire shares of the parent corporation
subject to certain conditions. 63 This result was achieved by placing fewer
restrictions on transnational mergers where shares are traded evenly one
for the other.64 It follows logically that it should not be easier for compa-
nies to do business transnationally than for companies to structure them-
selves in Canada as they wish.65 As long as the transaction enables the
company and its subsidiary to meet the solvency tests for cash-flow and
net assets as normally required, the transaction will stand.66 However,
the subsidiary cannot vote the shares. 67 Instead, the shares are cancelled
56. CBCA § 14(1) (replaces CBCA § 26(3)(a) (repealed 2001)).
57. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 18.
58. Id.
59. CBCA §§ 27(1), (4).
60. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 18.
61. CBCA § 27(1)(b).
62. Id. § 30(1)(b).
63. Id. §§ 31(3)(a)-(b).





222 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
to protect other shareholders from the subsidiary voting its shares in
favor of entrenched management of the parent corporation. 68 To offset
this enlargement of corporate choice, the directors bear liability for the
improper exercise of their discretion. 69 Once again, it is clear that the
CBCA amendments are creating a more globally friendly and open cor-
porate environment.
Further changes in the acquisition or redemption of a corporation's
own shares are specified in the CBCA amendments. A technical amend-
ment to the CBCA requires that when a federally chartered corporation
is evaluating whether acquisition or redemption of its own shares is al-
lowed under any exception, the corporation may not consider the amount
of funds already included in the corporation's liabilities in making the
calculation.70
The amended CBCA repeals the former section 44 in its entirety. 71
Section 44 dealt with a prohibition against financial assistance to parties
with a relationship to the corporation. 72 The intent of section 44 was to
protect shareholders, but protections already existed under fiduciary stat-
utes. 73 The result was more complicated financial transactions. 74 Other
existing laws impact the availability of financial assistance, namely those
associated with duties of directors. 75 Directors are still liable as fiducia-
ries and for duties of care and disclosure. 76
VI. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
A. THE ROI.E OF DIRECTORS
The roles, rights, and duties of corporate directors and officers received
tremendous attention in the CBCA amendments. The changes are
sweeping and move the Canadian law towards the Delaware enabling
model of director conduct, as opposed to the more regulated tradition of
earlier Canadian law. 77
A crucial change in the overall role of directors is seen in the amend-
ment to section 102. The previous CBCA required directors to "manage
[the] business and affairs of [the] corporation, . . . subject to any unani-
mous shareholder agreements. '78 The amended section 102 allows direc-
68. Id.
69. CBCA § 118.
70. Id. §§ 35(3)(b)(ii), 36(2)(b)(ii).




75. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 2.
76. Id.
77. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 14. See also Kenneth G. Ottenbreit & John
E. Walker, Learning from the Delaware Experience: A Comparison of the Canada
Business Corporations Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law, 29 CAN.
Bus. LJ. 364 (1998), for a general discussion of the pre-amendment CBCA.
78. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 5, at Can-4.
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tors to "manage, or supervise the management of. . ." the corporation. 79
This change is emblematic of an acceptance of the Delaware model of the
role of directors in corporations and other business forms. The impact of
this change in philosophy cannot be over-emphasized.
1. Director Residency Requirements
Previous versions of the CBCA required that a majority of the board of
directors be resident Canadians.8 0 While certain businesses of national
interest must maintain the majority rule, only 25 percent of the board of
other companies must now be composed of resident Canadians. 8' The
residency requirement for board committees has been removed alto-
gether.82 There is an overall requirement, however, that at least one
board member be a resident Canadian.8 3 So, for small boards with fewer
than four members the actual percentage of Canadian residents will be
higher. 84 It is also important to note that business may not be transacted
at a board meeting unless the 25 percent resident Canadian rule is
observed.85
In practical terms, the effect of requiring at least one resident Canadian
on a board is to ensure that at least one board member would be subject
to the jurisdiction of a Canadian court and to the statutory liabilities im-
posed on directors for misconduct. For foreign-controlled corporations
chartered under the CBCA, a unanimous shareholder agreement may be
used to relieve the board of directors of their powers, and therefore,
make the resident requirement moot.8 6 Since board committees have no
residency requirements, committees can be appointed to exercise all but
those powers not allowed to be delegated under section 115(3).87 Non-
delegable powers include submitting a matter to the shareholders for
their approval, filling a director or auditor vacancy or adding additional
directors, and issuing securities except as authorized by the directors. 88
2. Director Liability
Under the CBCA, directors continue to be joint and severally liable for
breaches of duty.8 9 The amended CBCA includes the term "solidarily"
liable.90 "Solidarily" means the same as joint and several liability and is a
79. CBCA § 102(1).
80. CBCA § 105 (2000) (amended 2001).
81. CBCA § 105(3). The other regulated-ownership businesses are uranium or busi-
nesses related to books or film distribution. See Kazanjian & Ahmed, supra note
22, at 4.
82. Kazanjian & Ahmed, supra note 22, at 2-3.
83. CBCA § 105(3).
84. Id. § 114(3)(a).
85. Id.
86. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 29.
87. Id.
88. CBCA § 115(3)(a)-(c).
89. Id. § 118.
90. Id.
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term borrowed from the civil code, used to encompass both the common
and civil law traditions of Canada. 9 1
Unfortunately, section 119 was not further amended to bring national
uniformity on an important issue. Specifically, section 119(1) specifies
joint and several liability to corporate directors for unpaid employee
wages. 92 Because solvent companies do not have problems paying their
employee wages, the CBCA is an odd place to address these issues. If the
liability for wages were created under the federal Bankruptcy and Insol-
vency Act, all Canadian companies would be under a uniform standard. 93
Case law limits the scope of the liability. A decision by the Canadian
Supreme Court has interpreted the CBCA statute as exempting directors
from liability for severance or termination pay.94 Three factors deter-
mine director liability for unpaid employee wages: the articles of incorpo-
ration, the provincial law where the employee works, and the status of
federal regulation of the particular company's industry. 95 In the case of
financial loss stemming from errors, omissions, or misstatements, a modi-
fied proportionate liability will apply.96 A director may be held responsi-
ble only for that portion of losses that arise from his degree of
responsibility. 97
The standard for a finding of director liability has also changed. Previ-
ously, director liability was imposed based on a finding of good faith reli-
ance.9 8 Now, the liability standard is the exercise of powers and
discharge of duties with honesty, good faith, and with the care, diligence,
and skill of a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances. 99 The ef-
fect of expanding the liability standard is to encompass a full due dili-
gence defense. In the event the director relied in good faith upon
financial statements made to him by an officer or "person whose profes-
sion lends credibility to statements made by. . .[him]," the due diligence
defense will be available. 100 In short, the previous CBCA contained only
a good faith reliance standard for defense of director wrongdoing, while
the new CBCA embraces the full due diligence defense of which good
faith is only a part. 10 1 Good faith reliance is a part of the exercise of
diligence, care, and skill that a reasonably prudent person would use in
like circumstances. 10 2 In contrast it should be noted that the U.S. model
is based on a "reasonably prudent director" who will be less risk averse
91. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 12.
92. CBCA § 119(1).
93. R.S.C. (1985), ch. B-3, §§ 91, 95, 100 (Can.); GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12,
at 30.
94. Barrette v. Crabtree Estate, [1993] S.C.R. 1027, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 1, as noted in
GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 30 n.161.
95. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 30.
96. CBCA §§ 237.1, 237.3.
97. Id. § 237.3(1).
98. CBCA § 123(4) (2000) (amended 2001).
99. CBCA §§ 122(1)(a)-(b), 123(4).
100. Id. §§ 123(5)(a)-(b).
101. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 3.
102. 1d. at 33.
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than a "reasonably prudent person." The more restrictive standard under
the CBCA could have detrimental effects on those companies whose di-
rectors have served only on boards in the United States and are less fa-
miliar with the Canadian standard.
3. Director Disclosure
The amended CBCA expands the definition of self-dealing. The direc-
tor now also must disclose not just contracts in which he has an interest,
but "material transaction[s]. ' 10 3 However, once the disclosure is made,
the director is "not accountable to the corporation or its shareholders for
any profit realized from the contract or transaction."'104 The amendment
means expanded disclosure, but creates a safe harbor once the disclosure
is made.The previous CBCA did hold directors and officers accountable
to the corporation and its shareholders for the profit from a contract en-
tered into when the director/officer was an interested party. 10 5 Under the
amended statute, corporations must give shareholders access to the no-
tices of material transactions. 106
4. Director Indemnification
The provisions for director indemnification have been expanded under
the amended CBCA. 107 The pre-amendment provisions of the CBCA in-
demnified the director or officer for acts done at the corporation's re-
quest once an action settled or to satisfy a judgment stemming from the
director's association with the corporation.108 The amendment expands
this protection by allowing for the advance of funds in the case of a legal
proceeding or investigation.1 09 The expansion of the definition of "enti-
ties" to include all business enterprises significantly broadens director in-
demnification beyond the traditional corporate form and includes
partnerships, trusts, and even unincorporated entities.110 Also, the in-
demnifying corporations no longer need a financial interest in the entity
on whose board the indemnified person occupies a director's position.'
The previous concept of indemnification, as stated in the CBCA, was
that the fiduciary duty of the director ran to the best interests of the com-
pany providing the indemnification. 112 Really, this was an enormous mis-
nomer of a director's fiduciary duty. The director owes a fiduciary duty
to the corporation on whose board he sits, not the company providing the
indemnification. 1 3 In other words, there could be many cases in which
103. CBCA § 120(1).
104. Id. § 120(7).
105. CBCA §120 (2000) (amended 2001).
106. Id. § 120(6.1).
107. Id. § 51 (replaces previous CBCA § 124 (repealed 2001)).
108. CBCA § 124(1) (repealed 2001).
109. Id. § 124(1)-(2).
110. Id. § 2(1).
111. Id. § 124(1).
112. Id. § 124(1)(a).
113. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 34, 35.
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the director would be required to act contrary to the best interest of the
indemnifying company in order to fulfill his duty to the corporation as a
board member.
The right to indemnification as previously provided by the CBCA was
subject to directors meeting their fiduciary duties and then prevailing on
the merits at trial, including a showing that the director reasonably be-
lieved his conduct was lawful. 114 The amended CBCA now permits in-
demnification as long as the director is not found to at fault either by act
or omission. .115 The overall effect is to encourage early settlement of
lawsuits involving director misconduct and to remove the accused direc-
tor's motivation to go to trial for vindication and indemnification. 16
The previous limit on eligible actions by directors for indemnification
coverage has also been lessened. In its previous form, the CBCA re-
quired the director to have complied with all of his fiduciary duties in
order to be eligible for indemnification. 1 7 The problem is that not all
breaches of fiduciary duties are deliberate or clear. Now, insurance com-
panies will regulate the scope of coverage available subject to market
forces and not by government regulation. 118
VII. INSIDER TRADING
A. INSIDER DEFINITION AND REPORTS
The definition of "insider" includes officers and directors of a distribut-
ing corporation, a subsidiary, or any other "body corporate that enters
into a business combination with a distributing corporation.' 1 9 Further,
insider definitions not necessarily including natural persons are found in
section 131 to include corporations, their affiliates, and any employees,
agents, independent contractors, or shareholders with confidential infor-
mation.1 20 The definitions create an extremely broad umbrella under
which all holders of confidential information will fall. Those companies
defined as "non-distributing" (private corporations in which shares are
not bought or sold on any public exchange) are also subject to insider
trading restrictions under the definitions created under section 131(1).121
Insider trading regulation is not just confined to conventional shares.
The definition of "security" has been expanded to include puts, calls, op-
tions, derivatives, or any other rights or obligations to purchase or sell a
security.1 22 The specific provision governing puts and calls has changed




117. CBCA § 124(4).
118. Id. § 51.
119. Id. § 126(1).
120. Id. § 131(1).
121. Id.
122. Id. § 131(2)(a), (b).
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stricted any insiders from any trading in puts and calls. 123 The overall
prohibition has been replaced with one making logical sense: selling calls
or buying puts is forbidden because they place the interest of the insider
in direct opposition to those of the corporation. 124
The sections of the CBCA regarding insider reports have been re-
pealed under the amended CBCA. 125 The purpose is to remove federal
securities regulations that were applicable jointly with provincial regula-
tions. With no federal regulation of securities, insiders will report solely
under the securities regulations in the appropriate provinces. Locating a
registered office in a province will trigger extraprovincial corporation li-
cense requirements for those companies operating under a federal
charter.126
New section 131(4) of the CBCA expressly demands privity in all trans-
actions subject to insider regulations.127 This means the proof in an in-
sider trading dispute will be difficult in cases involving the public security
markets because the buys and sells will have to match in order to show
the privity statutorily required. 128 Given the volume of trades possible, it
will be unclear whether any given buyer was the victim of a sale based on
insider information. Liability for insider trades remains as it was under
the previous CBCA: insiders will be liable both to the individual damaged
by the trade and to the corporation.1 29
B. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR INSIDERS
The previous CBCA used an ambiguous definition for insider activity.
The insider was liable if he "made use" of confidential information for his
own benefit. 130 The ambiguity has been removed by defining an insider
trade as one who "purchases or sells a security of the corporation with
knowledge of confidential information."1 31 Thus, tipping is specifically
forbidden, but the privity requirement is extended to these situations as
well. 132 Tipping had not been addressed in the CBCA prior to the
amendments. 133 The new definition establishes civil liability for "any
damages" suffered by a seller or purchaser affected by the insider activ-
ity.13 4 In fact, the liability is inflicted twice: once to the other party to the
transaction and once to the corporation. 135 Nonetheless, only direct dam-
age is dealt with by the CBCA under the tipping regime; advising others
123. GRAY & HALIADAY, supra note 12, at 4.
124. CBCA § 130(2); GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 4.
125. CBCA §§ 127, 129 (repealed 2001).
126. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 5, at Can-5.
127. CBCA § 131(4).
128. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 39.
129. CBCA §§ 131(4)-(5).
130. Id. § 131 (amended 2001).
131. Id. § 131(4).
132. Id. §§ 131(6), (7).
133. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 40.
134. CBCA § 131(4).
135. Id. §§ 131(4)-(5).
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to trade without disclosure of confidential information is not
forbidden. 136
VIII. RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS
A. MEETINGS AND RECORD DATES
The CBCA had previously provided for shareholder meetings to be
held within Canada unless all shareholders agreed otherwise. Now,
under the amended CBCA a meeting may be held outside of Canada as
long as that place is stipulated in the articles of incorporation.1 37 A mod-
ernization amendment also allows for meetings by any telephonic or elec-
tronic means.138 Smaller companies will benefit from the new provision
allowing notice for shareholder meetings of less than twenty-one days as
long as the articles of incorporation allow it.139
The timing of annual meetings has been altered by the CBCA amend-
ments. The previous statute allowed for a corporate meeting within eigh-
teen months of inception of the corporation, and within at least fifteen
months subsequently. Now, the subsequent meeting must be no later
than six months after the end of the corporation's preceding fiscal year.140
Fixing of the record date to determine shareholder eligibility under the
old CBCA was limited to certain purposes. Directors now have the abil-
ity to fix the record date for any other purpose in addition to those enu-
merated in the statute. 141 If the record date is not fixed, then the record
date will be the date before notice of the meeting is given.142 Notice had
been defined under the previous statute as fifty days prior but is now
within a prescribed period yet to be set by the regulations. 143
B. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
Unlike the United States, there have been few shareholder proposals
offered under Canadian law. 144 Shareholders, who are registered or ben-
eficial holders of shares, may make proposals for shareholder votes or ask
for discussion on matters during the annual meeting. 145 This is problem-
atic because third parties are holding more shares in the nature of mutual
funds, pension plans, or trusts. As a result, registered individuals are
holding fewer and fewer shares.
While the previous statute had allowed a "shareholder entitled to vote"
to present a proposal or matter for discussion, the Supreme Court of Ca-
136. Id. § 131(7).
137. Id. § 132(2).
138. Id. § 132(4).
139. Id. § 135(1.1).
140. Id. § 133(b).
141. Id. § 134(1)(e).
142. Id. § 134(2)(a)(1).
143. Id. § 135(1).
144. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 45.
145. CBCA § 137(1.1).
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nada had upheld a ruling that disallowed beneficial owners to do so. 14 6
The new statute makes the language and intent clear and overrules the
holding of the Supreme Court. 14 7 When making a proposal an eligible
shareholder must submit his name, address, and similar information
about his supporters including the number of shares each holds. 148 Once
received, the proposal must be accepted even if it makes statements or
proposals primarily for general economic, political, racial, religious, or
similar reasons. These types of statements had previously been grounds
for dismissal of the proposal by the corporation.149 Now the test for ac-
ceptance of shareholder proposals is whether it is related significantly to
the business of the corporation or its affairs. 150 The new amendments set
an early deadline for shareholder proposals of ninety days prior to an
annual meeting and the regulations prescribe a further test of the purpose
of the proposal. 151 The proposal must not attempt to address a personal
grievance or claim nor can it be grounded in an attempt for publicity. 152
The shareholder making the proposal must maintain his ownership of
shares up to the time of the annual meeting.15.3 If he does not the com-
pany is relieved of its duty to present the proposal to the remaining
shareholders. 154
This area of reform is a good example of the balance struck by the
amended CBCA. The shareholders are granted additional privileges but
are shouldered with additional identification requirements. Quantita-
tively, the shareholders make substantive progress with only procedural
restrictions.
Another corporate mechanism, the unanimous shareholder agreement,
has been expanded under the amended CBCA.15 5 Non-distributing cor-
porations typically utilize unanimous shareholder agreements to restruc-
ture their corporate governance in various ways that may or may not
include restrictions on board powers.1 56 Nonetheless, in order to fall
under the definition of a unanimous shareholder agreement the agree-
ment MUST restrict the powers of the board of directors.157
Issues regarding the transferability of unanimous shareholder agree-
ments have been settled under the amended CBCA. Notice of the agree-
ment must appear on the face of the shares transferred or purchased, but
if complied with, the transferee or purchaser is a party to the unanimous
146. Verdun v. Toronto - Dominion Bank, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 550.
147. CBCA § 137(1).
148. Id. § 137(1.2)(a)-(b).
149. Id. § 137(5)(b).
150. Id. § 137(5)(b.1).
151. Id. § 137(5).
152. Id. § 137(5)(b), (e).
153. Id. § 137(5.1).
154. Id.
155. Id. § 146. This section had included previously the statutory regime for pooling
agreements in addition to those for unanimous shareholder agreements. Pooling
agreements are now dealt with in new section 145.1.
156. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 49-50.
157. CBCA § 146(1).
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shareholder agreement by operation of law.158 Interestingly, the CBCA
does not encompass the conversion of shares situation that the Alberta
Business Corporations Act envisions by using the less-limiting term "is-
sued" to cover shares subject to unanimous share agreements. 159 It was
an interesting rejection of terms by the drafting committee given that an
Ontario court had already terminated an agreement where the shares had
been converted as opposed to transferred or purchased.
160
IX. PROXIES
The CBCA refinements regarding proxies are aimed at simplification
and recognition of real world situations and difficulties. The new CBCA
redefines "solicitation" to exempt certain kinds of communications from
a requirement for a proxy circular. 161 Solicitations of fewer than fifteen
shareholders or solicitations by public broadcast, speech, or publication
are exempt. 162 An important effect of this change is that it allows pri-
vately held companies with more than fourteen but fewer than fifty-one
shareholders the option not to distribute proxies. This fifty-shareholder
threshold corresponds to the definition of a "private" company found in
provincial securities regulations and unifies the substantive law regarding
proxies within private corporations. 163 For publicly held companies, the
end effect of these provisions is to allow for more dissemination of dissi-
dent proxies and shareholder communications, particularly for those with
widely-held shares that will be able to use the public broadcast
provisions. 164
X. SQUEEZE-OUT AND GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS
The amended CBCA expressly permits going-private transactions 165
and creates new part XVI of the statute entitled "Going-Private Transac-
tions and Squeeze-Out Transactions."' 166 A going-private transaction has
been defined as the termination of a shareholder's interest with
compensation. 167
The CBCA, however, will no longer jointly govern going-private trans-
actions for public companies in conjunction with provincial securities reg-
ulations. Instead, provincial securities regulations will regulate the
transactions. All language related to a "takeover bid" has been elimi-
nated from the CBCA to give effect to the new exclusive right of the
158. See CBCA §§ 49(8), 146(c).
159. Alberta Business Corporations Act, R.S.A., c. B-9, § 146(1) (2000) described in
GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 50.
160. See Sportscope Television Network Ltd. v. Shaw Communications Ltd., [1999] 46
B.L.R. (2d) 87, 92 O.T.C. 33.
161. CBCA § 147(b).
162. Id. § 150(1.1), (1.2).
163. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 52.
164. Id.
165. CBCA § 193.
166. Id. pt. XVI; MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 5, at Can-9.
167. Kazanjian & Ahmed, supra note 22, at 8.
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provincial securities regulations to govern such transactions. 168 The title
of part XVII of CBCA is no longer "Take-Over Bids," but rather "Com-
pulsory and Compelled Acquisitions.' 169 However, the CBCA director is
not a securities expert but rather a regulator of corporate governance.
Since securities transactions continue to be complex and numerous, the
need for securities expertise is clear. All-share or share-for-share bids,
bids for partial control, and the circulars discussing the bids are regulated
by the respective provincial regulations. 170 100 percent take-over bids
and issuer bids are still covered by the CBCA, albeit in a different form.
Since these bids involve the dissemination of unhappy minority share-
holders, the rights and duties are established in those sections of the
CBCA covering shareholder rights.171
The squeeze-out transaction in a private corporation, however, poses a
different problem because non-public corporations are not subject to pro-
vincial securities law. The CBCA has been amended to provide protec-
tion for minority shareholders in these situations. In order to comply
with CBCA provisions, a majority of the minority shareholders must ap-
prove the transaction. 172 One concern is that the new squeeze-out rules
are not restricted to transactions among related parties and may have
unanticipated effects on transactions seeking to eliminate minority share-
holder positions.' 7 3
XI. DISSENT AND APPRAISAL RIGHTS
Squeeze-out and going-private transactions have been specifically ad-
ded by name to the transactions that give rise to certain statutory dissent
and appraisal rights for shareholders.1 74 The power to enter into a
squeeze-out transaction only applies to non-distributing corporations.1 75
Nonetheless, by including the going-private and squeeze-out transactions
as "arrangements" under section 192, the CBCA specifically invites cor-
porations who are not insolvent to apply for court approval of their "ar-
rangement" (virtually any fundamental change in structure) where it is
not practicable to do otherwise. 76 The goal is to remove any uncertainty
about the validity of these particular transactions.
Minority shareholders of corporations should remain wary of their po-
sitions. Squeeze-outs have been characterized as a weapon for majority
shareholders for converting participating shares into non-participating
preferred shares by a simple majority and then approving a squeeze-out
based on the votes of each class. A minority of the majority then forces
168. Martindale -Hubbell, supra note 5, at Can-9.
169. CBCA pt. XVII; Id.
170. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 87.
171. Id.
172. CBCA § 194.
173. Kazanjian & Ahmed, supra note 22, at 8.
174. CBCA § 190(1)(f).
175. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 57.
176. CBCA § 192(3).
2004]
232 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
the squeeze-out. 177
The former version of the CBCA protected minority shareholders of
privately held corporations. 178 Protection was offered under a right of
compulsory acquisition when an offeror of a publicly traded company ac-
quired 90 percent of the shares it did not own. 179 The amended legisla-
tion continues this provision under a section applying to publicly traded
companies, but due to the repeal of all takeover language in the CBCA,
there will be no way for shareholders of non-distributing companies to
acquire the small share positions that may remain. 180 The remaining mi-
nority shareholder(s) may be eligible for a compulsory acquisition of his
shares and may initiate the acquisition by the offeror. 181 The remaining
shareholder(s) will be bound by the financial terms accepted by the other
shareholders and will not be able to seek a premium based on fair market
value.182
XII. CONCLUSION
The amended CBCA will have far-reaching effects on both public and
private companies. While the previous version of the CBCA was less hos-
pitable to private corporations than provincial statutes, the amendments
make federal chartering much more attractive.18 3 Private companies al-
ready in existence and under provincial charter will probably remain so,
given the difficulties in changing chartering status. Private companies
considering forming business entities may very well consider the federal
option.
The advantages of a federal charter include the dominion-wide license
of a name, the comparatively smaller Canadian-resident director require-
ments, and the availability of financial assistance transactions and
squeeze-outs.' 8 4 It may be problematic to clear a name through the fed-
eral registry and the need for proxies in some situations may complicate
some transactions.18 5 Finally, lawyers in many provinces may be unfamil-
iar with the provisions of the CBCA and the applicable case law. This
unfamiliarity leads to less comfort when advising a federal charter than a
familiar provincial one. i8 6
Lawyers assisting their clients on incorporation matters are faced with
two choices: the provincial incorporation statutes or the CBCA. There
will be occasions when the certain provincial choices are highly advanta-
geous. In the event U.S. investors want to incorporate in Canada but still
177. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 57.
178. CBCA §§ 194-205 (repealed 2001).
179. Kazanjian & Ahmed, supra note 22, at 6.
180. Id.
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183. Id. at 84.
184. Id. at 74.
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want flow through or branch tax status, Nova Scotia is the only province
offering this option.187 The reason the other provinces or the CBCA are
not an option is that they forbid the incorporation of unlimited compa-
nies. 18 8 Nova Scotia and British Columbia are also the jurisdictions of
choice for the typically forbidden transaction of subsidiaries holding
shares in their parent corporations. 189 Finally, in the event of a foreign
corporation doing business in Canada through a subsidiary, it is possible
to negate the requirement for resident Canadian directors. New Bruns-
wick and the three Canadian territories have all adopted a corporate gov-
ernance form modeled on the CBCA without the residency requirement
for directors.1 90 Quebec, Nova Scotia, and the territory of P.E.I. also wel-
come companies to incorporate without requiring resident Canadian di-
rectors, but their statutes are not modeled on the CBCA. 191
The new CBCA requirements for shareholder meetings will likely not
impact most private companies in the majority of their transactions. Most
private companies operate under a unanimous shareholder agreement
that dispenses with the need for shareholder meetings.' 92 There will be
times in many corporate histories when shareholder meetings will be nec-
essary due to dissent among shareholders. In this case, the amended
CBCA allows for less notice than previously required. 193 Notice may be
electronically transmitted where allowed by the corporate bylaws, but fi-
nancial information pertaining to the business of the meeting must be
received no less than twenty-one days prior to the meeting.1 94
The unanimous shareholder agreements themselves are subject to no-
tice by purchasers or transferees. 195 If notice is not received the remedy
is rescission.1 96 A valid unanimous shareholder agreement does impose
certain duties on shareholders not previously seen. When the agreement
transfers board powers to shareholders, the shareholders will be held to
the same standard of care that the role of fiduciary creates in the board of
directors. 197
For public companies, over 50 percent of the largest 500 companies are
already governed by the CBCA, whereas the overall percentage of feder-
ally-chartered Canadian companies is 12 percent.198 As such, the CBCA
is extremely influential in public corporate affairs. The amended CBCA
is an instrument of enormous change because it abandons its role as the
187. Companies Act, R.S, ch. 81, s. 1 (1989) (Can.).
188. GRAY & HALLADAY, supra note 12, at 77.
189. See Gray supra note 15 at 2-20.
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primary securities regulation and focuses on corporate governance. 199
In particular, the statutory acceptance of electronic technology will be
greatly welcomed by the corporate community. The repeal of Canadian
residency requirements shows an interest in growing the global stature of
companies chartered in Canada. Public companies will find reporting re-
quirements less complicated because the federal system will not receive
filings of insider notices.200 Financial statements will still be publicly filed
as before. As such, compliance with the applicable provincial securities
regulations should be less complex as practitioners and corporate officers
only focus on a single set of statutes and regulations. Some companies
may find the additional shareholder communication and dissident propo-
sal sections onerous, however. In practice, the changes will be most diffi-
cult because of the lack of familiarity with the new requirements. With
the passage of time most of the innovations will be easily implemented.
Overall, the amended CBCA allows directors to better lead their com-
panies into the 21st century. The CBCA changes the role of directors to
supervisors of management not to supervisors of the corporation. This
change will lead to more dynamic management based on the American
experience.
199. Id. at 85.
200. CBCA § 127 (repealed 2001).
